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POLYFURCATION AND THE RIGHT TO A CIVIL JURY 
TRIAL: LITTLE GRACE IN THE WOBURN CASE 
Sandra A. Smith* 
1. BACKDROP 
A. Woburn, Massachusetts 
It was January, 1972, and Anne Anderson thought her son Jimmy 
might have a cold.! He was feverish and pale and had lost his appetite.2 
Strangely enough, he was showing some mild bruising even though 
he had been in bed recently due to his sickness.3 Worried about her 
son, Anne, along with her husband Charles, took Jimmy to the family 
pediatrician.4 
Dr. McClean, after a quick physical, noted Jimmy's pallor, bruises, 
and persistent fever and thought Jimmy might not have a cold, but 
some sort of blood disorder.5 Further tests at Massachusetts General 
Hospital confirmed that three and a half-year old Jimmy Anderson 
had leukemia.6 
After Jimmy's diagnosis, Anne learned that one block away from 
her house, the Zona family and the Nagle family both had boys with 
leukemia.7 A year and a half later, Kevin Kane, from the other side of 
the Aberjona marsh, was diagnosed with leukemia. The Kane family 
lived in a house about a quarter of a mile away from the Andersons' 
in east Woburn.8 
* Managing Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 1997-1998. 
1 See JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION 14 (1995). 
2 See id. 
a See id. 
4 See id. 
5 See id. 
6 See HARR, supra note 1, at 15. 
7 See id. at 18. 
8 See id. at 21. 
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In November of 1975, while at Massachusetts General Hospital 
with Jimmy, Anne learned that a baby in a nearby room had died of 
leukemia.9 The Lilley family, from Woburn, had just lost their son.l0 A 
year later, Donna Robbins, also from Woburn, learned her son Robbie 
had leukemia,u Four years after Robbie's diagnosis, Donna Robbins 
lost her son to the disease.12 
All in all, there were nineteen cases ofleukemia in Woburn between 
1965 and 1980, triple the national norm. IS Eleven children died from 
the disease.14 
Shocked by the number of leukemia-stricken children in her neigh-
borhood, Anne Anderson searched for some commonalties.16 She 
noted that the air and water were shared by all the families with 
leukemia victims.16 Anne theorized that the terrible tasting water had 
something to do with Woburn's leukemia epidemic.17 Anne's theory 
was dismissed by her husband, her family doctor, her church pastor, 
and the specialist at Massachusetts General Hospital.18 
Things changed in 1979, when the town newspaper revealed city 
water wells G and H had been shut down. The wells closed because 
they were contaminated with trichloroethylene, a toxic industrial 
solvent, "that has been found to be carcinogenic."19 
B. The Trial 
The discovery of toxic contamination in the city wells serving east 
Woburn led thirty-three individuals to file a lawsuit against two sus-
pected polluters, the W.R. Grace Corporation (Grace) and Beatrice 
Foods, Inc. (Beatrice).20 Both companies had industrial subsidiaries 
9 See id. at 27. 
10 See id. at 27-28. 
11 See HARR, supra note 1, at 30. 
12 See id. at 34. 
13 See Michael Coakley, Polluted-Well Case Has Legal Heads '1'urning, CHICAGO 'l'RIB., Mar. 
16, 1986, at C1. 
14 See id. 
16 See HARR, supra note 1, at 21. 
16 See id. 
17 See id. 
18 See id. at 20, 25-26. 
19 See id. at 39; see also Evan T. Barr, Poisoned Well: The New Age of Toxic Tort, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC, Mar. 17, 1986, at 18 (stating trichloroethylene "has been found to cause cancers in 
lab animals, liver damage, neurological disorders, and cell mutation in humans"). 
20 See Third Amended Complaint at 1, Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1988) 
(No. 82-1672-S). 
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operating within 2,400 feet of Woburn wells G and H.21 The primary 
cause of action on the final complaint was negligent dumping of toxic 
chemicals, specifically trichloroethylene (TCE) and tetrachlo-
roethylene (perc), which plaintiffs claimed caused leukemia and other 
injuries to the victims.22 
Beatrice was implicated in the case because one of its lesser-known 
divisions, the John J. Riley Tannery, operated in east Woburn.23 The 
Riley division, still actively treating and processing hides, owned 
fifteen acres of land which bordered the Aberjona River near wells G 
and H, and was cited in the complaint as a major source of TCE 
contamination.24 Neighboring the fifteen acres, other industrial busi-
nesses operated such as the Whitney Barrel Company and Aberjona 
Auto Parts, potentially contributing to the waste on the property 
owned by Beatrice.25 
Grace's property was located farther to the north and east of the 
Aberjona River.26 While Grace made it clear in a press release that it 
did not produce chemicals at its Woburn site,27 employees stated that 
they used TCE as a solvent for cleaning greasy machine parts at the 
Woburn facility.28 
The working class families from Woburn filed suit against Beatrice 
and Grace claiming that the companies' negligent dumping of toxic 
chemicals led to the contamination of the city wells and eventually 
caused their children to die.29 Judge Walter Jay Skinner presided over 
the Woburn case after it appeared in the United States District Court 
for the District of Massachusetts.3o Faced with a complex toxic tort 
case involving two defendants and thirty-three plaintiffs, Judge Skin-
ner polyfurcated the case into various stages to simplify the trial 
21 Dan Kennedy, Environmental Tragedy and the Limits of Science (visited Feb. 5, 1997) 
<http://www1.shore.net/-dkennedy/woburn_trial.html>. Beatrice Foods Company, through 
the Riley Tannery, was responsible for environmental liabilities on fifteen acres of Tannery 
property, which was located about 700 feet from wells G and H. See id. W.R. Grace & Company 
owned and operated the Cryovac Division which was located about 2400 feet northeast of the 
wells. See id. 
22 See Third Amended Complaint, supra note 20, at 37. 
23 See HARR, supra note 1, at 90. 
24 See id. at 92. 
25 See id. at 92-93. 
26 See id. (map located on page before table of contents). 
27 See id. at 95. 
28 See HARR, supra note 1, at 175-76. 
29 See Third Amended Complaint, supra note 20, at 12. 
30 See HARR, supra note 1, at 105. 
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process.31 Using Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), he divided the 
case into four consecutive partS.32 Judge Skinner hoped that splitting 
the trial would create a logical evidentiary pathway and would de-
crease the potential for jury confusion.33 The first part of the Woburn 
trial was the Waterworks phase.34 This phase addressed the question 
of whether Grace and Beatrice negligently dumped TCE and perc and 
whether those particular chemicals reached wells G and H.35 The 
second phase of the trial, intended to be the Medical Causation phase, 
never occurred due to a negative finding for Beatrice on the Water-
works phase and a settlement between the plaintiffs and Grace.36 The 
Medical Causation phase would have addressed whether TCE and 
perc caused the plaintiffs' leukemia.37 The third and fourth phases of 
the trial, had the plaintiffs won on both previous parts, would have 
addressed damages.3s 
The Woburn case, as it has come to be called, is a prime example of 
how complex toxic tort cases are split into separate parts at trial in 
order to meet the needs of an overburdened judicial system. While 
Rule 42(b) permits judges to split issues at trial, applying the rule to 
mass tort cases has unique implications. The intricacies and complexi-
ties of the cases magnify the effects of issue separation. This Com-
ment will use the Woburn trial as an illustration of Rule 42(b)'s in-
fringement on the plaintiff's right to a fair jury trial.39 
II. INTRODUCTION 
Rule 42(b) permits the separation of issues at trial when such 
separation would further convenience, economy, or avoid prejudice to 
the parties.40 The text of the rule itself incorporates a specific limiting 
provision declaring that severance may not infringe on the Seventh 
31 See id. at 286-87. 
32 See id. 
33 See Third Day Pre-Trial Conference at 3...u6, Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910 (1st 
Cir. 1988) (No. 82-1672-8). 
34 See HARR, supra note 1, at 287. 
35 See id. 
36 See id. at 287, 392, 448. 
37 See Third Day Pre-Trial Conference, supra note 33, at 3...u7. 
33 See HARR, supra note 1, at 286-87. The book discusses a three-phase trial but the pre-trial 
hearing transcript reveals that a four-phase trial was intended with phase three covering 
individual plaintiffs and phase four resolving damages. See Third Day Pre-Trial Conference, 
supra note 33, at 3-U7. 
39 See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910 (lst Cir. 1988). 
40 See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). 
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Amendment right to a civil jury tria1.41 In the tort context, issue 
separation most commonly splits apart questions of liability from 
damages.42 This allows duty, breach of duty, and causation to be de-
cided in a wholly separate trial from the damages element. Mass tort 
and toxic tort cases have been subjected to further separation on the 
liability issue with causation alone broken out and tried separately 
before the rest of the case.43 
Complexity is the often cited justification for such a piecemeal 
approach to mass tort trials.44 Multiple plaintiffs, multiple defendants, 
numerous theories of liability, and often voluminous expert testimony 
on causation collectively contribute to trials of overwhelming com-
plexity.45 The severance allowed by Rule 42(b), on its face, appears to 
be an effective means to simplify and categorize the competing forces 
of complex tort cases. 
Such a piecemeal approach, while imposing categorization and or-
der on a trial, may violate the injured party's Seventh Amendment 
right to a jury tria1.46 Of particular significance is the difficulty plain-
41 See id. 
42 See Jack B. Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials: An Example of the 
Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. REV. 831, 831 (1961) (addressing local 
rule in Northern District of Illinois that requires submission of evidence on negligence to go to 
jury first before evidence on damages); see also CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2390 (1995). 
43 See In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 294, 306 (6th Cir. 1988) (issue of proximate cause 
tried first in thalidomide pharmaceutical toxic tort suit where plaintiffs claimed birth defects 
resulted, in part, from manufacturer's negligence). 
44 See Bendectin, 857 F.2d at 316; In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207, 216-17 (6th Cir. 
1982). 
45 See Robert F. Blomquist, Bottomless Pit: Toxic Trials, The American Legal Profession, and 
Popular Perceptions of the Law, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 956, 958 (1996) (book review). 
46 See Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury 
Trials, 40 AM. U.L. REV. 727, 747 (1991) (citing Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, THE AMERICAN 
JURY 52 (1966». A follow-up study done by Hans Zeisel and Thomas Callahan shows that 
plaintiffs win in forty-two percent of unified trials yet they win in only twelve percent of the 
trials in which liability is tried on its own before damages. See Hans Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, 
Split Trials and Time Saving, A Statistical Analysis, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1617 (1963) (study 
done by Zeisel and Callahan expanded on studies done in connection with the University of 
Chicago and Professor Harry Kalven, Jr. under the Jury Project). The procedural rule permit-
ting bifurcation of issues clearly has substantive impacts that are outcome-determinative in 
negligence trials. See id.; see also Cecil, supra, at 747 (noting many jury researchers rely on 
Kalven & Zeisel study while early reviewers found methodological shortcomings); Jennifer M. 
Granholm & William J. Richards, Bifurcated Justice: How Trial Splitting Devices Defeat the 
Jury's Role, 26 U. 'lbL. L. REV. 505, 514 (1995) (quoting Charles Wright, Procedural Reform: 
Its Limitations and Its Future, 1 GA. L. REV. 563, 569 (1967) (arguing effect of bifurcation on 
civil plaintiffs is "important side effect on substantive rights" which should require legislative 
action». 
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tiffs face in proving the causation element in toxic tort negligence 
cases.47 Causation in the toxic tort context often requires substantial 
amounts of expert scientific and medical testimony.48 Such medical 
theories offered up as proof push the boundaries of scientific knowl-
edge, not to mention the boundaries of the legal definition of proxi-
mate causation.49 
Federal courts are repeatedly unwilling to recognize violations of 
the Seventh Amendment resulting from the causation issue being 
tried separately in toxic tort cases.5O Plaintiffs, with the burden of 
proof, not only must avoid summary judgment to survive in the court-
room, but must be able to coherently present evidence of the entire 
case and controversy to the jury.51 
Polyfurcation, by parsing down trials to discrete elements of law, 
takes away the jury's ability to add their sense of fairness to the 
verdict.52 By separating out the legally constructed segment of causa-
tion from such complex toxic tort claims, the law imposes its power 
of definition on the jury and on society.53 Without learning more about 
the toxic tort case before them, juries are forced by judicial and legal 
boundaries to hear only one part of the controversy and their ability 
to weigh links between the legal elements disappears.54 
The current law interpreting Rule 42(b) fails to recognize the loss 
of jury power as a result of issue polyfurcation.55 This Comment 
47 See Albert P. Bedecarre, Comment, Rule 42(b) Bifurcation at an Extreme: Polyfurcation 
of Liability Issues in Environmental Tort Cases, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 123, 150 & n.202 
(1989) (citing Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 411-15 (1984) where "but for" test was 
reduced to substantial factor test in leukemia victims' case claiming nuclear testing caused 
illness); see also In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958, 962 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) Oatency 
problematic to pinpointing link between injury and silicone breast implants). 
48 See, e.g., Bendectin, 857 F.2d at 313 n.18; Breast Implant, 942 F. Supp. at 96~1. 
49 See Breast Implant, 942 F. Supp. at 96~1 (court appointed Rule 706 panel of experts to 
review scientific evidence regarding causation in silicone breast implant case); see also Schneck 
v. I.B.M., (No. 92-4370 GEB), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10126, *12-*13 (D. N.J. 1996) (defining 
mature mass torts as having litigation background establishing causation, essentially creating 
legal knowledge or legal recognition of causation). 
60 See, e.g., Bendectin, 857 F.2d at 316; Breast Implant, 942 F. Supp. at 962. 
61 See Breast Implant, 942 F. Supp. at 961. 
62 See Weinstein, supra note 41, at 832; see also Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 
500, 501 (1959) (stating ability to curtail right to jury trial should be carefully scrutinized). 
63 See ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY, MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 17 (1981) (describing the 
power of definition, naming and articulating boundaries as "great" and "sublime"). 
64 See Cecil, supra note 45, at 746 (difference between judge and jury decisions most often 
over issues where community values come into play). 
66 See, e.g., Bendectin, 857 F.2d at 315-16; Breast Implant, 942 F. Supp. at 962. Interestingly, 
Judge Jack B. Weinstein bifurcated the Breast Implant case in spite of the fact that he authored 
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argues that there are three mechanisms in Rule 42(b) application that 
work to infringe on an injured party's Seventh Amendment right to 
a jury trial. First, the lack of a well-defined common law standard 
delineating severable issues, combined with limited appellate review, 
too often permits judges to separate issues that are inter-related.56 
The lack of a definitive standard combined with abuse of discretion 
review creates an area of unchecked judicial discretion that infringes 
on the right to a fair jury trial.57 Second, polyfurcation of issues rein-
forces the power of evidentiary exclusions in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, keeping more factual knowledge about the case and contro-
versy from the jury.58 By creating multiple trials within a single cause 
of action, the point of reference for evidentiary tests changes from the 
entire case and controversy to a single legal element.59 Evidence 
relevant or probative to the case as a whole may no longer be relevant 
or probative to any single legal element.60 Lastly, polyfurcation en-
courages the construction of the law as purely scientific and rational.61 
Although these may be valuable elements, their presence to the ex-
clusion of all else removes the jury's constitutionally protected role 
from the law. 
Section III of this Comment provides background on the original 
purpose of Rule 42(b) and its use in the tort context. Section IV 
discusses the tension between the Seventh Amendment right to a 
jury trial and the evolving focus of the federal court system on pre-
trial case management. Section V summarizes mass tort and toxic tort 
cases where Rule 42(b) has been applied. Section VI discusses the 
mechanisms that operate in Rule 42(b) application to infringe on a 
plaintiff's right to a jury trial in the toxic tort context. Section VII 
a 1961 law review article while he was a professor of law at Columbia, warning against dangers 
of issue severance. See Breast Implant, 942 F. Supp. at 958; Weinstein, supra note 41, at 831. 
56 See, e.g., Breast Implant, 942 F. Supp. at 960-{il (disregarding plaintiff witness testimony 
that systemic and local injuries are linked and related). 
57 See Todd Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of Manage-
rial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 41, 84 (1995). 
58 See FED. R. EVID. 403 (requiring balancing of probative and prejudicial value of evidence). 
59 See, e.g., In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207, 217 (6th Cir. 1982) (excluding 
documents probative on defendants knowledge of aluminum wiring's greater propensity to 
cause fires, but prejudicial because they singled out defendants from one another). The question 
of relevance for any offered piece of evidence shifts from one of relevance to the cause of action 
as a whole to a smaller one of relevance to a particular legal element. 
60 See id. 
6! See, e.g., Breast Implant, 942 F. Supp. at 96O-Ql (special Rule 706 panel of experts appointed 
to review scientific evidence). 
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concludes with a recommendation for closer scrutiny by the court 
system and academics alike of the effects of Rule 42(b) severance. 
III. BACKGROUND ON RULE 42(B) 
A full critique of the use of Rule 42(b) in the toxic tort context 
requires a review of the rule itself and its historical development. 
Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a district 
court judge to order separate trials of "any claim or issue" that might 
otherwise be brought as a unified, single action.62 The Advisory Com-
mittee Notes to the 1966 Amendment state that "separation ... is not 
to be routinely ordered ... " and go on to explain "it is important that 
it be encouraged where experience has demonstrated its worth."63 
The text of the rule sets forth the parameters for allowing separation 
of issues. The relevant language is as follows: "The court, in further-
ance of convenience, or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will 
be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial 
... of any separate issue ... or issues .... "64 Convenience, economy 
and prejudice are essentially the main drivers of Rule 42(b) separa-
tion. Accordingly, issue separation is not routine, but must meet one 
of the specified goals in order to be justified.65 
The need for a rule permitting separation of claims and issues was 
in part due to the Federal Rules' liberal joinder policy.66 In order to 
avoid delay and expense associated with unrelated counter-claims, 
courts were quick to apply Rule 42(b) to the separation of entire 
claims but slower to use the rule for separation of issues within one 
cause of action.67 For example, in Gasoline Products v. Champlin 
Refining, petitioner bought suit to recover royalties under a gasoline 
processing license agreement.68 The respondent counter-claimed, al-
62 See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). 
63 See id. 
64 See id. 
65 See In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 307 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating piecemeal trial not the 
usual course but resorted to only when separation will achieve the purposes of the rule); see 
also Weinstein, BUpra note 41, at 831 (criticizing local rule requiring routine bifurcation of 
negligence trials in Northern District of Illinois). 
66 See 5 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 42.03[1] (2d ed. 1996); see alBo 
FED. R. CIV. P. 20(b). Rule 20(b) permits the district court to order separate trials where there 
has been joinder of parties to "prevent a party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to 
expense by the inclusion of a party against whom the party asserts no claim and who asserts 
no claim against the party." See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(b); Bee also 5 MOORE, supra, ~ 42.03[1] n.!. 
67 See Weinstein, supra note 41, at 840 (stating that assumption has been that separation of 
issues ought to be ordered only where there is highly persuasive reason). 
68 See Gasoline Prod. v. Champlin Ref., 283 U.S. 494, 495 (1931). 
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leging that the petitioner had breached a separate contract by failing 
to construct gasoline treating towers for respondent's gasoline treat-
ment plant.69 Due to an error made in the calculation of the damages 
award on the counter-claim, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit ordered a retrial of the damages issue only.70 The 
United States Supreme Court prohibited a retrial of solely the dam-
ages portion of the counterclaim on remand.71 The Court found that 
the question of damages was so "interwoven with that of liability that 
[damages could not] be submitted to jury independently of [liability] 
without confusion and uncertainty, which would amount to a denial of 
a fair trial."72 The new trial was required to resolve both liability and 
damages on the tower construction contract.73 The court stated that in 
order to figure damages appropriately, the jury must know or deter-
mine the terms of the contract, the dates of formation and breach, a 
reasonable time for performance, the number of towers to be built, 
the capacity of the towers, and whether or not there was a guarantee 
on the towers' quality.74 The issue of damages was found to be not so 
"distinct and separable" that it could be tried separately to a jury 
without violating the parties' right to a fair trial. 75 While forcing the 
entire counterclaim to be retried in full, the Supreme Court allowed 
the verdict on petitioner's initial royalty claim to stand unaffected 
because the issues "arising [under] ... the royalty contract [were] 
clearly separable from all others."76 
Although Gasoline Products was decided before the enactment of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it remains the leading case 
involving issue separation.77 The language "interwoven" subsequently 
has been adopted by federal courts to define issues that must be tried 
together in order to provide a fair jury trial to the parties.78 The 
language "distinct and separable" has been adopted to define issues 
that may be tried separately under Rule 42(b) without infringing on 
the parties' right to a jury trial.79 
69 See id. 
70 See id. at 496. 
71 See id. at 500. 
72 See id. 
73 See Gasoline Prod., 283 U.S. at 500. 
74 See id. 
75 See id. 
76 See id. at 499. 
77 See, e.g., In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 308 (6th Cir. 1988) (relying on Gasoline Prod. 
v. Champlin Ref., 283 U.S. 494, 500 (1931»; MOORE, supra note 65, ~ 42.03[1]. 
78 See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 286 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1961). 
79 See Bendectin, 857 F.2d at 308. 
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The text of the rule provides for separation of issues "in furtherance 
of convenience," "to avoid prejudice," or when "conducive to expedi-
tion and economy."80 It is within the district judge's discretion to 
balance these concerns and decide whether separation would be ap-
propriate.81 
For example, in Beeck v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive, the plaintiffs sued a 
water slide manufacturer in a products liability case.82 The plaintiff in-
jured himself while using a pool slide during a work outing.83 Aqua-
slide 'N' Dive denied manufacturing the slide and motioned for a 
separate trial to determine who manufactured the product.84 The 
United States District Court for the District of Iowa granted the mo-
tion based on the dispositive nature of the initial question and the 
possibility that it could save trial time, unnecessary expense and 
preparation for all parties.85 The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit also noted that a separate trial protected Aqua-
slide 'N' Dive from substantial prejudice, keeping evidence of plain-
tiff's severe injuries away from the jurors while they determined the 
manufacturer of the product.86 The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit upheld the bifurcation, finding that judicial 
economy was furthered and prejudice to the defendant was avoided.87 
Reviewing on an abuse of discretion standard, the appellate court 
found that one of the purposes of Rule 42(b), judicial economy, had 
been met without prejudicing either party.88 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld 
the bifurcation of issues in Lisa v. Fournier Marine. 89 The plaintiff in 
Lisa sustained serious permanent injuries resulting from the loss of 
oxygen while in a sealed compartment on defendant's barge.9o The 
trial court separated questions regarding the status of the appellant 
and the barge from the theories of liability claimed in the case.91 Once 
80 See FED. R. ClV. P. 42(b). 
81 See Beeck v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 562 F.2d 537, 542 (8th Cir. 1977) (balance of concerns 
led court to approve bifurcation). 
82 See id. at 538. 
83 See id. at 539. 
84 See id. at 541. 
85 See id. 
86 See Beeck, 562 F.2d at 541. 
87 See id. at 542. 
88 See id.; see also Airlift Int'l v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 685 F.2d 267, 269 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(abuse of discretion standard). 
89 See Lisa v. Fournier Marine Corp., 866 F.2d 530, 532 (lst Cir. 1989). 
90 See id. at 531. 
91 See id. at 531-32. 
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the status of the parties was determined, the case moved forward on 
the applicable theories of liability.92 The jury found for the defendant 
on all the claims.93 On appeal, the First Circuit upheld the bifurcation 
because (i) determining the status of the parties before continuing the 
trial avoided confusing the jury with mutually exclusive theories of 
causation; and (ii) the plaintiff failed to show any material prejudice 
resulting from the bifurcation.94 
Issue separation on its face appears to provide expeditious results 
in trials that have many potential issues and dispositive questions that 
can be raised early on, potentially avoiding the need for the remainder 
of the trial. Yet issue separation is not always proper. Judges are re-
quired to decide questions of bifurcation on a case-by-case basis, using 
their informed discretion and balancing all the equities involved.95 For 
example, the First Circuit upheld a district court judge's decision not 
to bifurcate proceedings in a suit to recover disability insurance mo-
nies.96 In Gonzalez-Marin v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the 
United States, the defendant insurance company motioned to bifur-
cate the trial between liability and damages and also motioned the 
court to exclude the disabled plaintiff from the courtroom.97 The de-
fendant based both of the motions on the premise that jurors' viewing 
of plaintiff's injuries would be unfairly prejudicial to their case.98 The 
First Circuit opinion cited the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit's decision in Helminski v. Ayerst Laboratories and 
merged its discussion of the bifurcation and exclusion motions.99 The 
First Circuit found that the defendant failed to show that viewing the 
plaintiff would substantially impair the jury and therefore found that 
the motion contained only conclusory allegations of prejudice.1°O The 
appeals court took special note that the trial court judge had directed 
counsel to bring the plaintiff into the courtroom before the jury en-
tered and wait until after the jury left to take him away thereby 
92 See id. 
93 See id. at 53l. 
94 See Lisa, 866 F.2d at 53l. 
95 See Beeck v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 562 F.2d 537, 542 (8th Cir. 1977) (balance of concerns 
led court to approve bifurcation); Stratagem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int'l N.V., 153 F.R.D. 535, 551 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (court must consider risks of prejudice, possible confusion, inconsistent adjudi-
cations of common issues, burden on parties, witnesses, and available judicial resources). 
96 See Gonzalez-Marin v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 845 F.2d 1140, 
1141, 1146 (1st Cir. 1988). 
97 See id. at 1145. 
98 See id. 
99 See id. at 1145--46 (citing Helminski v. Ayerst Lab., 766 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1985». 
)00 See id. at 1146. 
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decreasing the potential attention to plaintiff's injuries while plaintiff 
traveled to his chair.101 The First Circuit found that the trial judge's 
directive reflected a sensitivity to the parties' conflicting rights of due 
process and fair trial and upheld the denial of defendant's motion to 
bifurcate and the motion to exclude the plaintiff.102 
A. Rule 4~(b) in the Tort Context 
In the tort context, Rule 42(b) is most commonly used to separate 
liability and damages.103 Not only does putting the dispositive ques-
tion of liability first save potentially unnecessary trial time, but it 
keeps evidence regarding plaintiff's injuries out of the courtroom until 
liability is firmly established.104 Supporters of issue bifurcation in the 
tort context stress the need for jurors to decide the question of 
liability rationally, without being improperly swayed by the emotional 
power of the plaintiff's injuries.105 
In Helminski v. Ayerst Laboratories, the Sixth Circuit upheld bi-
furcation in a negligence case where plaintiff claimed her son's severe 
mental retardation was caused by her exposure to defendant's anes-
thesia, Fluothane, while she was pregnant.106 In response to defen-
dant's objections that the injured party be called as a witness,107 the 
trial court bifurcated the case, making the injured plaintiff's testi-
mony irrelevant to the liability phase. The trial court also excluded 
the injured plaintiff from the courtroom, preventing the jury from 
seeing him throughout the liability phase of the trial.108 The bifurca-
tion was upheld because the evidence relevant to damages (the extent 
of the plaintiff's injuries) could have a prejudicial impact on the jury's 
liability determination and because the evidence supporting the two 
issues was "wholly unrelated."109 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit sepa-
rated the discussion of the plaintiff's exclusion from the courtroom 
and found that, as a party to the lawsuit, he was excluded improperly 
from the courtroom.110 Such improper exclusions infringed on the 
101 See Gonzalez-Marin, 845 F.2d at 1147. 
102 See id. 
103 See MOORE, supra note 65, ~ 42.03[1]. 
104 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, § 2390; see also Helminski v. Ayerst Lab., 766 F.2d 
208, 211 (6th Cir. 1985). 
105 See, e.g., Helminski, 766 F.2d at 212. 
106 See id. at 210, 218. 
107 See id. at 212. 
108 See id. 
109 See id. 
110 See Helminski, 766 F.2d at 218. 
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plaintiff's due process rights.1l1 However, the Sixth Circuit found 
neither the exclusion nor the bifurcation to be reversible error, pri-
marily because the jury had already heard some evidence of the 
plaintiff's condition due to the late bifurcation of the case during the 
trial.u2 Therefore, the jury was able to "visualize the very human 
dispute" in the lawsuit.u3 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also 
upheld the bifurcation in Kisteneff v. Tiernan.U4 The appellant in 
Kisteneff claimed reversible error from the splitting of liability and 
damages in an assault and battery case when the trial was already 
underway.u5 Due to the scheduling difficulties of the appellant's testi-
fying doctor, medical testimony regarding the plaintiff's injuries could 
not be presented for five days.u6 As all other evidence had been 
presented in the case, the trial judge severed the issues of liability 
and damages so the jury could decide the question of liability without 
a five-day delay.l17 
The appellant, in challenging the bifurcation, argued that the doc-
tor's testimony would be probative to liability on the severity of the 
blow received.uB The First Circuit rejected that argument because 
the appellant did not assert that appellee responded to a minor provo-
cation with excessive force. U9 Appellant had argued that appellee 
struck the first blows and so the severity of the blow had no bearing 
on the legal argument made in the case.120 Therefore, the doctor's 
testimony was not probative to the liability phase of the trial, but just 
to the damages phase.l2l 
Upholding the separation, the First Circuit cited Wright & Miller's 
Federal Practice and Procedure treatise explaining that logically, 
liability must be established before the amount of damages can be 
determined.l22 Of additional interest to the court of appeals was the 
effort made by the trial judge to try the issues together.123 Only upon 
111 See id. at 213. 
112 See id. at 218. 
113 See id. at 219. 
114 See Kisteneff v. Tiernan, 514 F.2d 896, 897 (1st Cir. 1975). 
115 See id. 
116 See id. 
117 See id. 
118 See id. 
119 See KistenejJ, 514 F.2d at 897. 
120 See id. 
121 See id. 
122 See id. (citing WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, § 2390). 
123 See id. 
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learning that the jury deliberations would be delayed did the trial 
judge bifurcate the case and send the question of liability to the jury 
on its own.124 
Overall, the common law interpretations of Rule 42(b) demonstrate 
that severance decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis.125 
Each situation must be separately reviewed and the factors of con-
venience, economy and prejudice to the parties must be balanced to 
achieve a fair trial.126 District judges' decisions to bifurcate trials will 
be overturned only when there has been an abuse of discretion.127 
Accordingly, there are few limits on Rule 42(b)'s application because 
of its case-by-case determination and limited review required of issue 
separation decisions. 
B. Procedure v. Substance 
The Sixth Circuit, as noted above in the Helminski case, expressed 
concern about the jury's recognition of the human aspect of the law-
suit.128 This concern is particularly valid in light of the text of Rule 
42(b).129 The 1966 Amendment to Rule 42(b) added the language "al-
ways preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the 
Seventh Amendment."13o This language was added at the same time 
courts increasingly were separating the issues of liability and dam-
ages.131 The Advisory Committee recognized the potential for issue 
separation to interfere with a full and fair civil jury trial. It is that 
right the Advisory Committee intended to protect from procedural 
interference. 
Accordingly, further discussion of Rule 42(b) requires a brief over-
view of the procedure versus substance argument in the Rule 42(b) 
context. While this Comment does not focus on that argument, what 
follows is a summarized discussion of the procedure versus substance 
124 See Kistenefj, 514 F.2d at 897. 
125 See Beeck v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 562 F.2d 537, 542 (8th Cir. 1977) (case-by-case basis). 
126 See id. at 542 (balancing of the equities); see also Strategem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int'l N.V., 
153 F.R.D. 535, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (court must consider risks of prejudice, possible confusion, 
inconsistent adjudications of common issues, burden on parties, witnesses, and available judicial 
resources). 
127 See Airlift Int'l v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 685 F.2d 267, 269 (9th Cir. 1982) (abuse of 
discretion standard). 
128 See Helminski v. Ayerst Lab., 766 F.2d 208, 219 (6th Cir. 1985). 
129 See FED. R. ClV. P. 42(b). 
130 See id. advisory committee's note. 
131 See id.; Weinstein, supra note 41, at 831 (critiquing local rule that recommends routine 
separation of liability and damages in negligence trials). 
1998] THE RIGHT TO A CIVIL JURY TRIAL 663 
debate as it has been applied in the Rule 42(b) area. As noted below, 
courts routinely find Rule 42(b) a procedural rather than a substan-
tive rule of law. 
The Seventh Amendment "preserves the right to a jury trial in 
suits at common law .... "132 The Supreme Court in Galloway v. 
United States reiterated the historical test of United States v. Won-
son; namely that the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a 
jury trial according to the common law as it existed in 1791.133 The 
Galloway Court greatly impacted Rule 42(b) because it held that the 
Seventh Amendment "[does] not bind the federal courts to the exact 
procedural incidents or details of a jury trial according to the common 
law in 1791."134 This 1943 ruling reinforced the newly enacted Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure by permitting the courts to change the trial 
process to parallel a modernized society, but forced the substantive 
protections of the law to remain the same.136 
Cases involving Rule 42(b) follow that decision finding the applica-
tion of Rule 42(b) to be procedural in nature.136 For example, in Moss 
v. Associated Transport, the Sixth Circuit, relying on the distinction 
between substance and procedure, upheld the bifurcation of a case in 
federal court although state law prohibited such severance.137 
The parties in Moss brought various claims for death, personal 
injury, and property damage resulting from the collision of two tractor 
trailers.13s The United States District Court for the District of Ten-
nessee separated the issues of liability from damages and went to trial 
with liability questions first.139 The judgment resulted in a finding that 
Moss's negligence caused the accident.14o On appeal, the appellant 
cited Tennessee Supreme Court cases prohibiting the submission of 
separate issues to a jury in personal injury cases.141 The Tennessee 
Supreme Court, in Harbison v. Briggs Brothers Paint Manufactur-
ing, had found "depravation of the [state] constitutional right to trial 
by jury" where the trial judge by interrogatory had the jury resolve 
133 See u.s. CONST. amend. VII. 
133 See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390 (1943); United States v. Wonson, 28 F.Cas. 
745 (c.c.n. Mass. 1812). 
134 See Galloway, 319 U.S. at 390. 
135 See id. 
136 See Cecil v. Missouri Pub. Servo Corp., 28 F. Supp. 649, 650 (w.n. Mo. 1939). 
137 See Moss V. Associated Transp. Inc., 344 F.2d 23, 25 (6th Cir. 1965). 
138 See id. at 24. 
139 See id. at 25. 
140 See id. 
141 See id. at 26. 
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only one particular issue.l42 In Harbison, the Tennessee Supreme 
Court stated that the plaintiff had a state constitutional right to have 
all issues of fact submitted to the same jury at the same time.143 
The Moss court, relying on Erie v. Tompkins Railroad, noted that 
"procedural labels do not foreclose inquiry into the possible substan-
tive impact of a federal rule."l44 The appellant argued in Moss that 
bifurcation at the trial court allowed the surviving widows of the de-
ceased drivers to gain the sympathy of the jury.145 Appellant claimed 
that evidence of his injuries, which would have countered such one-
sided sympathy, was unfairly kept out of the trial due to the severance 
of liability and damages.146 Additionally, appellant asserted that, under 
the Erie doctrine, Tennessee law applied and the federal trial court 
improperly affected his substantive rights by denying him a fair jury 
trial as protected by Tennessee law.147 
Resolving the appeal, the Sixth Circuit stated that it would be 
"unjustified" to assume there would have been a different outcome 
had the issues of liability been submitted to the jury at the same time 
as damages.148 Therefore, the court quickly found that the requisite 
showing of substantive impact affecting the outcome of the case, 
required by Guaranty Trust v. York, was not met and the application 
of Rule 42(b) in Moss was held to be procedural, rather than substan-
tive.149 
Additionally, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit's Rosales v. Honda Motor opinion, the court found Rule 42(b)'s 
application to be primarily procedural where bifurcation conflicted 
with state law prohibiting severance of issues in personal injury 
cases.150 Citing Hanna v. Plumer, the Fifth Circuit reiterated that 
"the constitutional provision for a federal court system augmented by 
the Necessary and Proper Clause carries with it Congressional power 
to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courtS."15l 
The court went on to state that this "includes a power to regulate 
matters, which though falling within the uncertain area between sub-
142 See Moss, 344 F.2d at 26 (citing Harbison v. Briggs Bros., 209 Tenn. 534 (1962)). 
143 See id. 
144 See id. at 27 
145 See id. at 25. 
146 See id. at 26. 
147 See Moss, 344 F.2d at 26-27. 
148 See id. at 27. 
149 See id. 
150 See Rosales v. Honda Motor Co., 726 F.2d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 1984). 
151 See id. at 261. 
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stance and procedure are rationally capable of classification as 
either."152 Rule 42(b), the court explained, is not primarily substantive 
because it does not "[affect] people's conduct at the stage of primary 
activity" and it is not "a right granted for one or more non-procedural 
reasons, for some purpose or purposes not having to do with the 
fairness or efficiency of the litigation process."l53 
The labeling of Rule 42(b) as procedural allows the federal courts 
to separate issues in diversity cases where applicable state law might 
prohibit the severance.l54 But as Rosales points out, the lines between 
procedure and substance are not always definitive.l55 The now Federal 
District Judge Weinstein, in a 1961 law review article, argues against 
such bifurcation where a state law requires a unified trial,156 He as-
serts that applying the state law would meet the substantive concerns 
of Erie while the unified trial would meet the federal court's desire to 
protect the constitutional right to a jury trial.157 The conflict, he claims, 
is easily resolved here, because both the federal and state policies 
point to classifying the rule as substantive.15B Accordingly, the blanket 
classification of Rule 42(b) as procedural may be a tenuous one and 
cases such as Moss and Rosales demonstrate the recognition by state 
courts that severance indeed does have some substantive impact.159 
IV. RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 
The classification of Rule 42(b) as procedural permits its use to alter 
the process of trials.160 By changing the way in which a case is pre-
sented, the jury's role arguably changes as well. As the jury plays an 
important role in tort litigation, the impact of Rule 42(b)'s use is 
significant. Judge Weinstein notes that jurors are valued because they 
do not decide issues solely on a rational basis, but decide questions of 
fact in a way the litigants and community find desirable.161 Moreover, 
152 See id. (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965». 
153 See id. at 262. 
154 See id.; see also Erie R.R. Co. v. Thmpkins, 307 U.S. 64 (1938); Moss v. Associated Transp. 
Inc., 344 F.2d 23, 26 (6th Cir. 1965). 
155 See Rosales, 726 F.2d at 262. 
156 See Weinstein, supra note 41, at 836. 
157 See id. 
158 See id. 
159 See, e.g., Rosales, 726 F.2d at 262; Moss, 344 F.2d at 27. 
160 See, e.g., Rosales, 726 F.2d at 262; Moss, 344 F.2d at 27. 
161 See Weinstein, supra note 41, at 832. 
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they respond in ways that judges should not: to the immediate com-
munity sense of fairness. 162 
The critical role played by the jury, while impossible to define 
completely, does encompass the following ideals: "to infus[e] the law 
with the values of the communitY,"I63 to "serv[ e] as a check on judicial 
power,"I64 to act as "the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by 
which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution."I65 
Finally, it should be noted that "the strongest objection originally 
taken against the Constitution ... was the want of an express provi-
sion securing the right of trial by jury in civil cases."166 Indeed the 
role of a civil jury is an important one, highly valued by our system 
of government.167 
Unfortunately this intangible role is being diminished as the mana-
gerial judging movement takes hold.168 Rule 42(b) separation is just 
one of the many pre-trial moves that increase the impact judges have 
at the outset of trials. 169 Pressures of increased litigation and crowded 
dockets have fueled judges' expanded involvement with cases as they 
move through the court system.170 
The expanded use of Rule 42(b) as a judicial tool flows from sys-
temic increased judicial management of complex cases and must be 
reviewed only as part of a larger picture. One example of the legal 
system's official endorsement of this judicial involvement is the evo-
lution of Rule 16, which permits the judge to order a conference before 
trial with counsel from both parties to discuss a number of issues. l71 
The original 1938 rule listed six reasons for scheduling a conference 
with parties' attorneys: to consider (1) simplification of the issues; (2) 
the necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings; (3) the 
possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and documents which will 
avoid unnecessary proof; (4) the limitation of the number of expert 
witnesses; (5) the advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to 
162 See id. 
163 See Cecil, supra note 45, at 728. 
164 See Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment, 53 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1005, 1033--34 (1992). 
165 See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 397 n.1 (1943) (Black, Douglas, Murphy, J.J., 
dissenting). 
166 Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 3 Pet. 433, 446 (1830). 
167 See Peterson, supra note 56, at 84; Klein, supra note 164, at 1033-34. 
168 See Peterson, supra note 56, at 84. 
169 See id.; Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 379-80 (1982). 
170 See id. at 379. 
171 See FED. R. Crv. P. 16; Peterson, supra note 56, at 70. 
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a master for findings to be used as evidence when the trial is to be by 
jury; and (6) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the 
action.172 
Amendments in 1983 and 1993 significantly broadened the list of 
permissible topics for Rule 16 conferences.173 Some of the expansions 
include the ability to address "formulation and simplification of the 
issues, including the elimination of frivolous claims or defenses," the 
authority to require pretrial conferences for scheduling and case man-
agement, and the ability to address "the control and scheduling of 
discovery, including orders affecting disclosures and discovery pursu-
ant to Rule 26 and Rules 29 through 37."174 
Professor Judith Resnick, a prominent scholar in the area of judicial 
procedure, analogizes judicial case management to judicial activism.175 
Yet, this form of judicial activism, she warns, will go unchecked, 
because managerial judging is less visible, usually more unreviewable, 
and offers fewer procedural safeguards to protect litigants from abuse 
of judicial authority.176 Despite Resnick's cautionary words, the move-
ment toward increased judicial case management was secured when 
Congress passed the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.177 Title I of 
the statute requires that all federal district courts implement a Civil 
Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan (the Plan) within three 
years of the statute's enactment.178 Incorporated into the Plan for the 
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, the 
site of the 1986 Woburn trial, is an express provision under Local Rule 
16.3 permitting a judicial officer, "in furtherance of the scheduling 
order ... [to] provide for the ... phased resolution ... or bifurcation 
of issues for trial consistent with Federal Rule 42(b)."179 
Sanctions for non-compliance with any of the rules of the Plan 
explicitly include dismissal of the case, but state that sanctions will 
be at the sound discretion of the judicial officer,180 who will determine 
when a sanction is appropriate and tailor the sanction to the particular 
172 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee's note; Peterson, supra note 56, at 69-70. 
173 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee's note; Peterson, supra note 56, at 69-70. 
174 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16; Peterson, supra note 56, at 70-71. 
175 See Resnick, supra note 166, at 380. 
176 See id. 
177 See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101--B50, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codified 
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994)). 
178 See Federal Civil Practice (93-05.07) 7, (MCLE 1992). 
179 Federal District Court for the District of Massachusetts Local Rule 16.3, reprinted in Rules 
Supplement 30,17:7 (2d ed., LAWYERS WKLY. 1997). 
180 See id. 
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situation.1s1 Interestingly, there are few limits on judicially imposed 
sanctions, thereby furthering the judicial influence over trials, their 
processes and most importantly, their outcomes. 
The United States Supreme Court has upheld sanctions adminis-
tered in Link v. Wabash Railroad, in reaction to non-compliance with 
pre-trial proceedings.l82 The Court upheld the dismissal of a case be-
cause the plaintiff's counsel did not attend a scheduled pre-trial con-
ference.1ss The Court based its decision on the necessity that courts 
have the authority to manage their own affairs "so as to achieve the 
orderly and expeditious disposition of the cases."l84 
The congressional mandate of the Judicial Improvements Act and 
the court necessity argument made in Link, taken together, evidence 
an atmosphere that will encourage the increased expansion of judicial 
authority in the courtroom.1S5 This pre-trial discretion will impact 
cases in a variety of ways before they even reach the trial stage. 
Consequently, less flexibility exists for the parties to gather and 
present information to the jury in the manner they deem proper. Rule 
42(b) is just one piece of the larger judicial management puzzle. While 
it may be addressed separately, the impacts of Rule 42(b) are neces-
sarily linked to the other procedural mechanisms affecting parties at 
any given trial. With more and more of these procedural moves being 
made at the pre-trial phase, juries will be less involved with the trial, 
will have a more structured trial from which to render a verdict, and 
consequently, will be less able to act as a check on judicial discretion. 
Professor Todd Peterson, in his article, Restoring Structural 
Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of Managerial Judging, high-
lights three main areas impacted by the expanded discretionary 
power of federal district judges.l86 First, the unrestrained discretion-
ary control of the pre-trial process makes it easy for a judge to allow 
bias to influence the management of the case.1S7 Peterson notes the 
potential for various types of bias,. from racial and gender bias, to 
ideological bias, that may affect the case.1SS Second, he points out that 
181 See id. 
182 See Peterson, supra note 56, at 65. 
183 See id. (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962»; see also Peterson, supra note 56, 
at 65. 
184 See Peterson, supra note 56, at 80. 
185 See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101~50, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codified 
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994»; see also id. (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 
626 (1962». 
186 See id. at 78. 
187 See id. 
188 See id. 
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arbitrary decisions are fostered simply because pre-trial decisions are 
unguided and unreviewable.189 Third, as the final decision-maker in 
the case, a federal judge has large coercive power to force parties to 
settle, which significantly limits party autonomy.1oo 
Rule 42(b), as one of the many pre-trial case management tech-
niques, is at risk of somewhat arbitrary application by federal district 
judges. The judicial order mandating bifurcation is not reviewable on 
direct appeal as a final verdict.191 It is reviewable after a final judg-
ment has been made in the entire case and may constitute reversible 
error if separation is found to have unfairly prejudiced a party.1OO 
Of particular significance to complex tort cases is the economy and 
time-savings that result from bifurcation of negligence trials.l93 
Judges deciding whether or not to bifurcate issues in complex cases 
are pressured by heavy caseloads, backlogged dockets, and a legal 
system encouraging judicial activism at the pre-trial stage.l94 The 
decision-maker facing the question of bifurcating a negligence trial 
does not act in a vacuum. With complex cases requiring significant 
judicial resources no matter what the trial format, judges, not sur-
prisingly, will be pressured to apply Rule 42(b) whenever they can. 
The only limit on the widespread application of Rule 42(b) is found 
in the text of the rule itself: "always preserving inviolate the right to 
trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment."l95 The court in 
Gasoline Products interprets Rule 42(b)'s Seventh Amendment limi-
tation, holding that the right to a jury trial encompasses the right to 
have an issue of fact decided without jury confusion and uncertainty.l96 
Confusion can arise from the independent presentation of "inter-
woven" issues to the jury.197 
In Beacon Theatres v. Westover the court notes that judges should 
use their discretion "wherever possible" to preserve a litigant's right 
to a jury trial. l98 In Beacon Theatres, the United States District Court 
judge permitted the separation of a case which placed the trial of 
189 See id. 
190 See Peterson, supra note 56, at 81. 
191 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, § 2392. 
192 See id. 
193 See Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 45, at 1619. 
194 See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101~50, § 102, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1994». 
196 See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). 
196 See Gasoline Prod. v. Champlin Ref., 283 U.S. 494,500 (1931). 
197 See id. 
198 See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959). 
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equitable issues before the trial of the legal issues.199 On appeal, the 
United States Supreme Court prohibited severance and lauded the 
importance of the jury as a fact-finding body. The Court went on to 
explain that putting the legal issues together with the equitable issues 
would preserve the litigant's right to a jury trial by having the jury 
decide all relevant facts at once.200 As such, the Supreme Court, in 
1959, displayed a sensitivity to the effects of Rule 42(b) severance on 
the jury trial received by the litigants and importantly recognized 
that single factual determinations by the jury may bear on two seem-
ingly distinct parts of a case.201 
V. COMPLEX TORTS-HEIGHTENED ISSUE SEPARATION 
Although the jury's role is a critical one in a civil trial, the balancing 
of economy, efficiency, and potential prejudice to the parties still oc-
curs by the trial judge in every case affected by Rule 42(b). Logically, 
the organizational benefits and time-saving potential of Rule 42(b) 
have a higher marginal value to a judge faced with a particularly 
complex case. The potential gain from severance in those cases weighs 
heavily in favor of issue separation. Multiple plaintiffs, multiple de-
fendants, and scientific evidence combine to create a potentially over-
whelming trial for a judge to coordinate. Not surprisingly, legal schol-
ars recommend issue separation in complex cases.202 Concerns 
of complexity inevitably focus on the jury, with issue separation sup-
porters positing that lay juries are not capable of understanding the 
relevance and significance of all the facts presented together.203 Addi-
tionally, because issue separation limits the presentation of evidence 
to narrow legal issues, it is viewed as a procedurally sound way of 
forcing juries to make decisions based on evidence, not emotion.204 
199 See id. 
200 See id. at 508. 
201 See id. at 510. 
202 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.632 (3d ed. 1995). 
203 See Cecil, supra note 41, at 743. "While the accuracy of [unreasonable jury awards leading 
to increased litigation] is in doubt, the result has been to cast doubt on the competence of the 
civil jury to render a fair and reasoned decision .... " Id. "Juries are not competent to decide 
issues in complex, lengthy trials. Critics claim that jury attention span decreases in long trials, 
especially antitrust, products liability, or medical malpractice cases, which entail complicated 
evidence. In addition, juries are likely to be misled, or confused in such cases by the 'battle of 
experts' over technical evidence, thereby eliminating any chance for a fair, rational decision." 
Id. at 744 n.104; see also Judyth W. Pendell, Enhancing Juror Effectiveness: An Insurer's 
Perspective, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 311-12 (1989) (recommending narrowing and 
severing issues to enhance juror effectiveness). 
204 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, § 2390; see also Pendell, supra note 200, at 311-12 
(recommending narrowing and severing issues to enhance juror effectiveness). 
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The trend with complex tort cases is to separate the trial into 
continually smaller pieces beyond simply liability and damages.205 The 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio in In 
re Bendectin Litigation separated out the issue of proximate causa-
tion for trial and allowed evidence first on that issue alone.206 If plain-
tiffs succeeded, the questions of liability and damages would have 
followed in separate trials.207 
The plaintiffs in the Bendectin case brought claims against Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals on behalf of children with birth defects, alleging 
that defendant's anti-nausea drug, intended to alleviate morning sick-
ness, caused birth defects.208 The Bendectin case involved 1180 claims 
in approximately 844 multi-district cases.209 After twenty-two days of 
trial on proximate causation alone, the jury found that Bendectin was 
not the proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries.210 
The plaintiffs appealed from the trial court verdict claiming preju-
dicial error in the trifurcation of the case.211 The court analogized the 
three-phase trial to bifurcation, applying the same legal standards to 
the trifurcation, including the case-by-case balancing requirement of 
the purposes set forth in Rule 42(b).212 Relying on a case that upheld 
severance of the statute of limitations issue, the court stated that 
"Rule 42(b) is sweeping in its terms and allows the court, in its 
discretion, to grant a separate trial of any kind of issue in any kind of 
case."213 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected 
the plaintiffs' argument that the resolution of issues was rendered 
more difficult by the trifurcation of the case.214 The Sixth Circuit 
stated that trifurcation substantially improved the manageability of 
the presentation of proofs and concluded that trifurcation, if anything, 
enhanced the jury's ability to comprehend the causation issue.215 
200 See, e.g., In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 306 (6th Cir. 1988) (issue of proximate cause 
tried separately); In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207, 210 (6th Cir. 1982) (separated out 
causation-in-fact for separate trial). 
206 See, e.g., Bendectin, 857 F.2d at 306. 
2117 See id. at 295. 
206 See id. at 293-94. 
209 See id. 
210 See id. at 294. 
m See Bendectin, 857 F.2d at 314. 
212 See id. at 308; see also Beeck V. AquasJide 'N' Dive Corp., 562 F.2d 537, 542 (8th Cir. 1977) 
(balancing concerns in severance decisions). 
213 See Bendectin, 857 F.2d at 308 (decision whether to try issues separately is within sound 
discretion of trial court). 
214 See id. at 315. 
215 See id. 
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The Bendectin court cited Wright & Miller's Federal Practice and 
Procedure treatise to support the premise that judges may separate 
any issue of any kind.216 Interestingly, Wright & Miller base their 
efficiency argument supporting trifurcation in part on the Kalven and 
Zeisel study done in connection with the University of Chicago in the 
1950s.217 The Kalven and Zeisel figures show defendants win in sev-
enty-nine percent of bifurcated trials, yet win in only forty-two per-
cent of unified cases.218 Quickly assuming that emotional decision-mak-
ing accounts for the disparity in percentages, Wright & Miller 
advocate not only the time-saving benefits of issue separation but 
argue that separation avoids prejudice to the defendant as well.219 
That same study, according to a recent law review article, shows 
that complexity does not drive differing results between judge and 
jury verdicts.220 This premise counters the idea that complexity cre-
ates jury confusion. In complex cases, emotional decision-making does 
not necessarily substitute for lack of understanding by juries.221 Re-
searchers found verdict disparities between judges and juries were 
notably increased in cases where community values played a role.222 
This would lead one to believe that issue separation inappropriately 
uses complexity as a justification to keep issues away from a jury that 
could comprehend the issues but might decide the case differently 
than judges.223 If in fact community values account for judge and jury 
verdict disparities, issue separation in those instances would limit the 
role of the jury and violate the Seventh Amendment.224 
The Bendectin court, by citing Wright & Miller, embraces the con-
clusion reached by the treatise authors and unfortunately overlooks 
216 See id. at 308 (citing CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
§ 2389 (1971». 
217 See Cecil et al., supra note 45, at 747 (citing Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, THE 
AMERICAN JURY 52 (1966». 
218 See id. at 747; see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, § 2390. 
219 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, § 2390. 
220 See Cecil, supra note 45, at 746. 
221 See id. at 728, 762. 
222 See id. at 746. 
223 See id. at 762. 
224 See id. at 729 (assumptions regarding juror comprehension are incorrect and so should be 
invalid as basis for polyfurcation and restriction of jury input); see also Granholm & Richards, 
supra note 45, at 534 (noting that juries were "ahead of' the legal doctrine with respect to 
comparative negligence). 
The Sixth Circuit, in In re Bendectin Litigation cites their own ruling in In re Beverly Hills 
Fire Litigation to support the splitting of cases into more than two phases. See In re Bendectin 
Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 308 (6th Cir. 1988). Interestingly, the Manualfor Complex Litigation warns 
against issue separation where it would "prevent a litigant from presenting a coherent picture 
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a valid argument that polyfurcation of trials in complex tort cases may 
infringe on the plaintiff's right to a jury trial.225 The discussion below 
points out three ways in which the law may infringe on a civil jury 
trial in a complex tort case. First, the lack of a well-defined common 
law standard combined with abuse of discretion review permits 
judges to separate issues under Rule 42(b) when the issues are related 
and intertwined.226 Second, trials within a larger trial magnify the 
impact of the Federal Rules of Evidence on the case and permit the 
exclusion of evidence helpful to a plaintiff more often than in a unified 
triaJ.227 Third, polyfurcation encourages the law to be purely scientific, 
decreasing the jury's ability to infuse the law with community val-
ues.228 
A. Lack of a Limiting Standard 
In the Woburn case, it is understandable that Judge Skinner poly-
furcated the trial. Precedent in earlier toxic tort cases and mass tort 
cases demonstrates that trifurcation decisions are upheld on appeal 
and lauded for their rationality and economical use of the courts' 
time.229 The Manual for Complex Litigation states that severance of 
issues can often reduce the length of trial and improve comprehension 
of issues and evidence.23o Wright & Miller's Federal Practice and 
Procedure supports the severance of issues, crediting issue bifurca-
tion with increased time-savings at trial and more rational decision-
making by juries.231 
The Woburn case involved thirty-three plaintiffs, two defendants, 
a singular causal event and mUltiple claims including negligence, nui-
to the trier of fact" and cites the Bendectin case for such a premise. The Bendectin case permits 
issue separation and should have been decided differently in order to clearly support the concept 
recommended in the Manual for Complex Litigation. As it is, the irony is all too strong that 
the Bendectin case is being used as an example of issue separation that does not result in jury 
confusion and an incoherent picture for the trier of fact. 
225 See Bendectin, 857 F.2d at 307 (also citing United States v. 1071.08 Acres of Land, 545 F.2d 
1350, 1352 (3d Cir. 1977». While the court did note that this was no "ordinary" case, it still relied 
upon the basic premise that trifurcation decisions are within the trial judge's discretion. See id. 
226 See, e.g., In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958, 960--61 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (permitting 
severance necessarily disregards witness testimony that systemic and local injuries are related). 
227 See, e.g., In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207, 217 (6th Cir. 1982) (excluding 
documents in causation phase that would be admissible in trial on liability generally). 
228 See Cecil, supra note 45, at 730 (noting that legal rules develop in part from juror wisdom 
using comparative negligence as an example). 
229 See, e.g., id. at 308. 
230 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.632. 
231 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, § 2390 (discussing concerns about severance and 
concluding that some constitutional concerns are insubstantial). 
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sance, and emotional distress.232 As a complex mass tort case, Woburn 
would appear to be a "textbook" case for severance.233 It is reasonable, 
and expected, that Judge Skinner might inquire into issue separation 
benefits of potential time-savings, prevention of prejudice to the de-
fendants, and categorical convenience in presenting evidence. 
Complexity, present in the Woburn case, has been a consistent 
justification for the bifurcation of mass tort trials. The Sixth Circuit 
in In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation supported bifurcation of liability 
and damages in part because the proof required for various issues was 
extensive and expensive.234 The Bendectin appeals court upheld sepa-
ration of the proximate cause element because the multiplicity of 
litigation "could substantially immobilize the entire Federal Judici-
ary" with 1100 cases each taking 38 days of trial time.235 Not surpris-
ingly, in the Woburn case, creating a manageable trial plan concerned 
Judge Skinner because the case involved thirty-three plaintiffs, and 
a novel toxic tort causation claim.236 
Transcripts from the Woburn case reveal that Judge Skinner voiced 
his concerns regarding the complexity of the trial as early as Decem-
ber 6, 1985, two months before the beginning of the tria1.237 Judge 
Skinner commented to counsel that submitting all thirty-three causa-
tion and damages issues in one trial would be "unbelievably cumber-
some or unworkably cumbersome."238 Additionally, during more ex-
tensive discussions with counsel about the trial plan, Judge Skinner 
expressed a significant interest in "efficiency and clarity and logical 
progression in the evidentiary presentation."239 
232 See Third Amended Complaint, supra note 20, at 1, 36--39. 
233 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 33.2; see also Peter Shuck, The Role of Judges 
in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 338 n.7 (1986). 
Peter Shuck, Professor of Law at Yale Law School and author of a book on the Agent Orange 
litigation, defines complex litigation to include some or all of the following: 
numerous parties raising unprecedented claims, which are to be resolved on the basis 
of a massive and ambiguous factual record concerning events or relationships that span 
long time periods and large geographical areas, and which will require resolution of 
novel procedural, choice of law, substantive, and remedial issues. Adjudication of such 
a case is very costly and time consuming, and any judgment or settlement reached, 
even one for money damages, is likely to be difficult to implement. 
Shuck, supra, at 338 n.7. 
234 See In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207, 216 (6th Cir. 1982). 
235 See In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 316 (6th Cir. 1988). 
236 See HARR, supra note 1, at 175-76; see also Third Amended Complaint, supra note 20, at 
12. 
237 See Hearing at 27-28, Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1988) (No. 82-1672-
S). 
238 See id. at 27. 
239 See Third Day Pre-'!rial Conference, supra note 33, at 3-66. 
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The only precedential limit Judge Skinner had before him when 
making the polyfurcation decision was the standard set down in Gaso-
line Products.24o The Gasoline Products standard states that issues 
may be presented independently to a jury so long as they are separate 
and distinct.241 Specifically, the United States Supreme Court declared 
that any separation of interwoven issues resulting in jury confusion 
and uncertainty would amount to a denial of a fair jury trial.242 
As future cases have interpreted the separate and distinct stand-
ard, little guidance has been provided as to what "separate and dis-
tinct" actually means. Bendectin interpreted separate and distinct to 
require evidence supporting each issue to be different and that one 
issue must logically flow from the other.243 In Bendectin, the testimony 
and evidence required for proximate cause was considered different 
from the evidence required to prove injuries to the plaintiffs and 
consequently justified the fact that proximate cause could be tried on 
its own to the jury.244 Additionally, the court put weight on the logical 
progression of issues requiring liability to be established before any 
damage determination could be made.245 
Later courts have found "general causation" being tried on its own 
as problematic. In Schneck v. International Business Machines, the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey rejected 
a motion to have causation tried first as a separate issue with respect 
to a consolidation of ten plaintiffs' "repetitive stress injury" claims 
allegedly caused by the use of various products produced by the 
defendant.246 The New Jersey court rejected the motion, because the 
resolution of general causation would not resolve specific plaintiffs' 
claims or any specific medical conditions with respect to particular 
products produced by the defendant.247 The Schneck court quoted the 
Manual for Complex Litigation and noted that "empirical research 
suggests that decisions to consolidate and bifurcate trials may affect 
jury decisions about liability and damages."248 The court followed that 
argument up with broad general language from numerous cases de-
240 See Gasoline Prod. v. Champlin Ref., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931). 
241 See id. 
242 See id. at 500. 
243 See In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 309 (6th Cir. 1982). 
244 See id. at 308-14. 
245 See id. at 309. 
246 See Schneck v. I.B.M., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *23-*24 & n.7 (D. N.J. 1996). 
247 See id. 
248 See id. at *16. 
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claring that justice cannot be sacrificed even if judicial economy were 
furthered.249 
The case-by-case interpretation of separate and distinct issues re-
sults in hundreds of distinguishable cases for a district judge to re-
view when attempting to apply Rule 42(b) to a particular case. There 
is simply no "separate and distinct" standard that assists the judge in 
determining the limits of Rule 42(b) applicability to a unique case. 
Juror confusion and uncertainty is the strongest precedential meas-
ure of a limit to issue separation.250 The United States Supreme Court 
has at least made clear that jury confusion and uncertainty amounts 
to a denial of a fair trial.251 It is then up to the district court judge to 
predict whether polyfurcation will create or avoid jury confusion. 
Jury confusion and uncertainty existed in the Woburn case as dem-
onstrated by the jury's inconsistent interrogatory responses.252 In 
answering the various interrogatories, the jury found that Grace was 
responsible for a significant portion of the TCE and perc found in 
wells G and H, and that Grace had acted negligently.253 Although the 
jurors could not determine when Grace first began making a "substan-
tial contribution" to the contamination of Wells G and H, they deter-
mined negligence was responsible for Grace's "substantial contribu-
tion" beginning in September, 1973.254 Without knowing when Grace 
first started "substantially contributing" pollutants to wells G and H, 
it is unclear how the jury determined the September, 1973 date for 
Grace's negligent "substantial contribution" of toxins to the wells.255 
249 See id. at *17 ("consolidation is never appropriate if the fair and impartial administration 
of justice would be jeopardized"). See also In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litig., 11 F.3d 368, 
374 (2d Cir. 1993) (mass torts becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy where individual issues are 
diminished at the expense of due process rights); Malcolm v. National Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346, 
350 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831, 853 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(explaining systemic urge to aggregate litigation must not be allowed to trump dedication to 
individual justice, and each individual plaintiff's and defendant's cause must not be lost in the 
"shadow of a towering mass litigation"); Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281, 1285 (2d Cir. 
1990) ("obligation of courts to deliver justice cannot ever be sacrificed for the benefit of cheaper 
and more rapid dispositions"). 
250 See Gasoline Prod. v. Champlin Ref., 283 U.S. 494, 500 (1931). 
251 See id. 
252 See Kennedy, supra note 21. 
253 See Kennedy, supra note 21. 
254 See Kennedy, supra note 21. The jury interrogatories and answers, paraphrased for clarity, 
are as follows: 1. Was Grace responsible for TCE and perc in the wells? Yes; 2. When did Grace 
first begin making a substantial contribution to the wells? Not Determined; 3. Had Grace acted 
negligently? Yes; 4. When did Grace first begin making a substantial contribution to the wells 
as a result of its negligence? September, 1973. See Kennedy, supra note 21. 
255 See Kennedy, supra note 21. 
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Jurors interviewed after the trial indicated that the wording of the 
interrogatories was to blame for their confusion. In an interview with 
a reporter from The American Lawyer, jurors commented that the 
phrasing of the jury questions "made it impossible for them to per-
form their duty."256 
The confusion experienced by the jurors because of the poorly 
worded questions necessarily implicates the polyfurcation of the case. 
Toxic tort cases justify polyfurcation, in part, based on jury instruc-
tions and the use of interrogatories.257 In the Woburn case, the ques-
tions posed to the jury and the difficulty the jurors had responding 
resulted, in part, from the limited trial presented to the jury. The 
jurors did not hear all the facts related to the controversy which 
would have helped them understand the chronology of events being 
tried in the courtroom. For example, evidence of when the plaintiffs 
first started getting sick was relevant to when contaminants may 
have first reached the wells. While evidence of plaintiffs' injuries 
could not have been used to establish defendant's liability, additional 
information about the context of the well contamination would have 
helped the jury reach the whole truth of the matter. 
Judge Skinner, in hearing testimony, expressed concern that plain-
tiffs would use a circular argument to prove the defendants' well 
contamination caused the injuries.258 While that is indeed a very valid 
concern, keeping contextual information from the jury serves to con-
fuse the jury and hinder the most truthful and accurate resolution of 
the facts in question. Information regarding when plaintiffs first be-
gan getting sick may not be legally relevant to causation, but keeping 
the information from the jury does not serve the ends of justice 
because it does not aid the jury in reaching an accurate picture of the 
entire case and controversy at hand.259 The timing of plaintiffs' first 
signs of sickness would have placed the causation evidence in context 
with the injuries claimed by plaintiffs and would have given jurors a 
more complete picture of the realities contested by the parties. Forc-
ing the jury to answer very limited, very specific questions with less 
than all available and relevant information is illogical and cannot be 
256 See Kennedy, supra note 21. 
257 See In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207, 214 (6th Cir. 1982) Gudge's instruction 
brought human concern to the jury). 
268 See Hearing, supra note 237, at 28 (explaining that plaintiffs cannot use evidence of 
sickness and timing of sickness to prove well contamination). 
259 See id. at 217 (information excluded due to prejudice on question not yet before the court 
and such information would have been admissible in a unified trial). 
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justified simply because the law has imposed rigid legal categories 
and artificial structure on our organic world. The polyfurcation pa-
tronizes the jury, assumes that less information is safer for the jury 
to decide upon, and unfortunately results in jury confusion about the 
case at hand. 
The current standard for interpreting Rule 42(b) applicability fails 
to recognize the loss of meaning that results from the deconstruction 
of a cause of action. Juror confusion existed in the Woburn trial, yet 
under the Gasoline Products separate and distinct test, Rule 42(b) 
authorized polyfurcation and exclusion of contextual facts from the 
case.260 Case-by-case determination of whether issues are separate 
and distinct does not allow the development of applicable precedent 
to guide judges in their severance determinations. Judge Skinner had 
little legal precedent before him that defined jury confusion or more 
fully interpreted separate and distinct according to the complexities 
of the Woburn case. The lack of interpretive precedent guiding sev-
erance decisions limits the check on judicial power that normally 
exists with precedent and stare decisis.261 It expands the discretionary 
power afforded to judges and it lessens the uniformity intended to be 
forwarded by the Rules of Civil Procedure. The practical effect of the 
ill-defined separate and distinct standard is that it inadequately pro-
tects the right to a fair jury trial, as guaranteed by the Seventh 
Amendment.262 
B. Increased Influence of the Rules of Evidence 
The use of Rule 42(b) may also infringe on an injured party's right 
to a jury trial because of the increased influence of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence within the entire trial. The Federal Rules of Evidence, 
adopted in 1975, essentially codified the existing common law rules of 
evidence and brought some uniformity to the admissibility of evidence 
in federal courts. Importantly, the underlying purpose of the Rules of 
260 See Gasoline Prod. v. Champlin Ref., 283 U.S. 494, 500 (1931). 
261 See Peterson, supra note 56, at 56 & n.48. '''Secondary discretion' exists when the rules of 
review accord the lower court's decision an unusual amount of insulation from appellate revi-
sion .... It gives the trial judge a right to be wrong without incurring reversal." See id. at 56. 
262 See Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 45, at 1617-19 (showing defendants have increased 
success in bifurcated trials). Without a complete understanding of how trials change due to 
bifurcation, courts should be far less willing to sever issues in the toxic tort context. Causation 
may be the most difficult issue to prove for plaintiffs, and that is exactly why they should be 
afforded every opportunity to share information with the jurors. 
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Evidence includes aiding the court in reaching the truth of the matter 
and providing justice to the parties.263 
But the Rules of Evidence are not without flaws. For example, 
researchers revealed that in an asbestos case, the adversarial presen-
tation of scientific evidence led the jury to misunderstand the devel-
opment of asbestosis.264 Evidence presented to jurors in the case did 
not emphasize the variable nature of asbestosis.265 Accordingly, jurors 
gathered from the facts presented that all individuals with asbestosis 
would become severely disabled and die as a result of the disease.266 
Researchers blamed self-interested presentation of complex testi-
mony for the misconceptions of the jurors in the study.267 While our 
evidentiary system relies on adversarial presentation of facts, that 
presentation does not always encourage the just, fair, or truthful 
result. 
Reinforcing flaws such as this, the separation of issues magnifies 
the impact of the Rules of Evidence on an entire trial. Each party will 
of course utilize the exceptions available in the Rules of Evidence to 
exclude opposing party's testimony. To the extent that more trials 
within each case allow evidence to be excluded, less information will 
ultimately reach the jury. 
Relevance, required by Rules 401 and 402, must exist between the 
offered piece of evidence and the singular legal element at trial in a 
particular phase. The relevance requirement shrinks from the entire 
case to one prong of a cause of action. Consequently, areas of potential 
probativeness narrow and areas of potential prejudice increase at 
each and every stage of the trial. The relevance window closes some-
what for each piece of evidence. Evidence relevant to liability and 
damages must pass evidentiary tests for liability and damages sepa-
rately in a bifurcated case rather than passing a broader evidentiary 
test once in a unified trial. 
Splitting of issues may be lauded for its organizational benefits, but 
such categorization will force the exclusion of evidence from the jury 
as a result of the link between legal categories and evidentiary 
boundaries. 
263 See Professor Dean Hashimoto, Lecture at Boston College Law School (Sept. 2, 1997). 
264 See Cecil, supra note 45, at 755. 
265 See id. 
266 See id. 
267 See id. 
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In In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, for example, the trial court 
separated the issue of causation in a hotel fire case.268 The plaintiffs 
claimed that faulty aluminum wiring within an empty wall caused the 
fire which resulted in the deaths of 165 people and injuries to many 
others.269 Plaintiffs contended that due to a number of physical char-
acteristics of "old technology" wiring, heat developed at the connec-
tion of the aluminum branch circuit wiring, and this heat eventually 
ignited the wooden studs and other building material in the wall.270 
Defendants argued that the area in question was not proven to be 
wired with aluminum wiring, and additionally, that the fire started in 
a different area as a result of copper wiring and numerous fire code 
violations.271 Defendants included several manufacturers of "old tech-
nology" aluminum wiring who potentially supplied products for the 
building.272 
On appeal, plaintiffs argued that separating out the causation ques-
tion prohibited probative evidence from admission into the tria1.273 
The documents excluded at trial supported plaintiffs' theory that 
aluminum wiring has a greater propensity to cause fires and showed 
that some defendants knew of this propensity.274 The trial judge de-
termined that the documents were "admissions as to some defen-
dants" regarding knowledge that aluminum wiring causes fires, but 
hearsay as applied to other defendants.276 Further, the judge found 
that the documents, probative on the issue of liability, were inadmis-
sible in the causation phase because their probative value was out-
weighed by the potential for prejudice if a specifically identified de-
fendant were singled out.276 
In the Beverly Hills Fire case, the hearsay exception,277 the nar-
rower relevance requirement,278and the prejudice exception279 acted 
to exclude evidence helpful to the plaintiffs' case that would have been 
admissible in a unified tria1.280 The overall strength of plaintiffs' case 
268 See In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207, 210 (6th Cir. 1982). 
269 See id. at 210-11. 
270 See id. 
271 See id. at 211. 
2'12 See id. at 210. 
273 See Beverly Hills Fire, 695 F.2d at 216. 
274 See id. at 217. 
276 See id. 
276 See id. 
277 See FED. R. EVID. 801, 802. 
278 See id. 401, 402. 
279 See id. 403. 
280 See id. at 216-17 advisory committee's note. 
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or plausability of plaintiffs' theory did not get heard in full by the jury. 
Relying on this example is not an attempt to argue that the docu-
ments were legally relevant to causation, but merely demonstrates 
that legal relevance tests become narrower in polyfurcated trials and 
may act to create a scenario where evidence relevant to the entire 
case may never be relevant to any narrowly defined legal element and 
may interfere with the parties' right to present their case in full. 
Plaintiffs face an uphill battle when trying to prove causation in a 
toxic tort case. Issue separation limits the amount of probative evi-
dence plaintiffs may bring in a toxic tort trial and serves to cut the 
tenuous strings that may exist for plaintiffs to prevail in a courtroom. 
This evidentiary limitation may infringe on an injured party's right to 
a fair trial. 
Polyfurcation of the Woburn case resulted in having questions of 
negligent dumping and groundwater contamination tried first.281 This 
restricted the jury from hearing anything not legally relevant to those 
issues. Jurors did not hear evidence of the timing of plaintiffs' injuries 
or anything else excludable under the multiple exceptions available in 
the Rules of Evidence. Due to the adversarial presentation of evi-
dence, the jury also never heard the results of the Riley Tannery's 
own hydrogeological study done in 1983.282 The study found that 
groundwater underneath the Tannery flowed to the east, toward the 
city wells, through very porous soil, confirming plaintiffs' expert tes-
timony offered at trial.283 
With polyfurcation magnifying the impact of the Rules of Evidence, 
flaws inherent in the rules multiply each time a new trial stage gets 
carved out by a judge. At some point, the narrower evidentiary 
question unjustly acts to exclude evidence the original rules never 
intended to be prohibited from the courtroom. 
C. Law . .. More Than Just Science and Logic 
Issue separation in the toxic tort context encourages the law to be 
purely scientific and legally rational. Such scientific requirements, to 
the exclusion of all else, improperly limit the role of the jury in toxic 
tort litigation when causation is tried separately. By allowing a case 
to be split into progressively smaller elements, the jury is no longer 
281 See HARR, supra note 1, at 287; see also Third Day Pre-Trial Conference, supra note 33, 
at 3~6, 3~7. 
282 See HARR, supra note 1, at 459~0. 
283 See id. at 460. 
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able to render a verdict on the entire "case or controversy" and their 
ability to infuse community values into the law is diminished.284 
Issue separation occurs at the discretion of the trial judge. Judicial 
discretion therefore, creates the categories that will be tried sepa-
rately and defines the boundaries of supporting evidence that the 
court will permit the jury to hear. The definitions of severed issues 
become impossible to check by jury verdict and enlarge the discre-
tionary and potentially arbitrary power of district court judges.285 
Comparative negligence is an often-used example that demon-
strates the jury's infusion of community values into tort law.286 Before 
comparative negligence existed, contributory negligence required 
judgment for the defendant if the plaintiff was found to be negligent 
in any way, no matter how limited the transgression.287 With contribu-
tory negligence as the law, juries would return verdicts for the plain-
tiffs with discounted damages rather than judgment for defendants.288 
The jury's own value balancing led the law to eventually adopt com-
parative negligence as a legal standard.289 ' 
It could be argued that sympathy for the plaintiffs' injuries had 
supported the juries' awards of discounted damages without regard 
to the logic and rationality of the law.290 Such an argument oversim-
plifies the situation and discredits the actions taken by the jury. There 
are in fact other ways to analyze the jury's discounted damages ap-
proach. The jury could be balancing a different set of values than 
those allowable by law or simply according different weight to the 
values already incorporated into the legal doctrine. For example, in 
the risk assessment context, experts traditionally determine overall 
risk on the basis of mortalities caused by an activity.291 While layper-
sons often estimate a similar number of deaths from the same activity, 
their overall risk assessment may be higher than the experts' re-
284 See Cecil, supra note 45, at 728. "When a democratic society seeks to impose the rigors of 
the law on an individual, it must justify those standards to a panel of citizens and allow the 
austere expression of the law to become infused with the values of the community." [d. 
286 See Klein, supra note 164, at 1034 (noting before there was a draft Constitution, each state 
actively promoted juries as a check on judges). 
286 See Weinstein, supra note 41, at 834; see also Cecil, supra note 45, at 730. 
287 See Weinstein, supra note 41, at 834; see also Cecil, supra note 45, at 730. 
286 See Weinstein, supra note 41, at 834; see also Cecil, supra note 45, at 730. 
289 See Cecil, supra note 45, at 730; Granholm & Richards, supra note 45, at 534 (noting three 
state supreme courts credited juries with being "ahead of them" in comparative negligence 
doctrine). 
290 See Weinstein, supra note 41, at 834-i35 & n.14. 
29) See Cecil, supra note 45, at 761~2 (citing Slovic, 236 SCI. 280, 285 (1987» (expressing 
unsuccessful expert attempts to educate public, whom experts believe harbor "irrational fears"). 
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sults.292 Laypersons simply value other factors in addition to mortality 
figures.293 Researchers have determined that "dread risk" is a sig-
nificant additional factor considered by laypersons in risk assess-
ment.294 "Dread risk" is defined as "a combination of the perceived lack 
of control over the activity, the potential for catastrophe, the likeli-
hood of fatal consequences in the event of an accident, and the degree 
of inequitable distribution of risks and benefits."295 Accordingly, when 
experts and laypersons disagree about the level of risk an activity 
generates, the differences are due to additional factors incorporated 
into the laypersons' formula. Rationality and understanding do not 
disappear from the laypersons' risk assessment. The values incorpo-
rated into the formula are simply different than those infused into the 
risk formula by the "experts."296 Importantly, scholars suggest that 
the values incorporated by laypersons and "overlooked by formal 
analysis" are often essential for human welfare or psychological well-
being.297 
Redefining the mechanics of jury decision-making to include differ-
ent, but rational decision-making would undermine the assumption 
that emotion or sympathy is always to blame for disparate jury-judge 
verdicts.298 Recognizing that juries make rational yet different deci-
sions would comport with the value the Framers of the United States 
Constitution placed on the jury's role in the courtroom.299 Currently, 
the law assumes that juries and litigants need to be protected from 
sympathetic jury decisions.3°O Polyfurcation is lauded as a mechanism 
that forces rational decision-making in juries while avoiding sympa-
thetic or prejudicial decision-making.301 This limited perspective, 
when used by the law, incorrectly justifies paternalistic treatment of 
292 See id. at 762 (noting nuclear power as example where experts and laypersons differ on 
their risk assessments). 
293 See id. 
294 See id. 
296 See id. 
296 See Cecil, supra note 45, at 762. 
297 See id. (citing Fischoff, Behavioral Aspects of Cost-Benefit Analysis, ENERGY RISK MGMT. 
269, 27jhgO (1979». 
298 This approach directly contradicts the conclusion reached by Wright & Miller in their 
treatise (which is often cited by judges in case law to support severance decisions) that juries 
decide complex cases based on emotion. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, § 2390; see also 
In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 308 (6th Cir. 1988); Helminski v. Ayerst Lab., 766 F.2d 208, 
212 (6th Cir. 1985). 
299 See Klein, supra note 164, at 1033-34; see also Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 397 
n.1 (1943). 
300 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, § 2390. 
301 See id.; see also Helminski, 766 F.2d at 212. 
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jurors and leads to increased separation of issues, especially in cases 
where injuries may be severe. 
This narrow viewpoint is significant, particularly in the area of 
causation in the toxic tort context. The law demands causation be 
proved by scientific methods.302 Courts reject the possibility that any 
level of common experience could aid the jury in finding causation in 
toxic tort cases.303 Yet common experience or empirical evidence ex-
ists where science breaks down. Common experience sets the path-
way for scientific development and is arguably the only truth available 
until science begins to explain our reality. This common experience 
boundary is used to justify the severance of causation into its own 
unique trial without regard to the circumstantial evidence excluded 
from the courtroom. 
In Woburn for example, the jury was not allowed to hear any 
evidence about when the plaintiffs became sick. Such information 
was excluded because of the polyfurcation of the case. As discussed 
above, information about when plaintiffs first became sick would have 
avoided jury confusion at the time of the jury interrogatories. Evi-
dence of illness may have affected the jury's perception of the chemi-
cal solvent activity on defendants' properties. 
Legally, such an inference could be criticized as not relevant to 
the defendants' chemical dumping activities and the groundwater 
flow under defendants' properties. Yet, such a criticism assumes two 
things: first, that the adversarial court system encourages truth-tell-
ing by blamed parties; and second, that the scientific evidence regard-
ing chemical solvents under defendants' properties incorporates all 
necessary information to protect society from harm. 
Woburn demonstrates that these two assumptions are incorrect 
and supports the premise that evidence of the timing of plaintiffs' 
illnesses should have been provided to the jury. First, the Woburn 
trial did not encourage truth-telling by defendant Beatrice. Criticism 
could be pointed at the phrasing of eleven requests by plaintiffs' 
counsel for information about defendants underground solvent lev-
302 See In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958, 961 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). 
303 See Bendectin, 857 F.2d at 314. The court refused to apply § 433B of the Restatement which 
would have allowed an alternate jury instruction. See id. The court rejected § 433B application 
because there was no element of common experience in finding causation: "[T]he linkage be-
tween ingestion of the drug and the birth defects is simply not supplied by common experience." 
See id. 
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els.304 Yet that would overlook the systemic problem that still permit-
ted defendant Beatrice to keep its own hydrogeologic data out of the 
trial. 
Second, the battle of the scientific experts in the Woburn case 
resulted in the jury finding that Beatrice did not act negligently.305 
Yet, the EPA and the United States Geological Service, after the trial, 
reported that the Beatrice land was in fact a "source of contamination 
to the wells."306 
The legally permitted severance of the Waterworks phase clearly 
did not incorporate enough information to protect society from harm. 
The limited trial addressing negligent dumping and contamination of 
the water wells may, on its face, comport with Rule 42(b) and the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. Yet somehow the law did not "catch" a 
problem deeply harmful to the Woburn community. This failure of the 
law to reach toxic tort harms in the trial context should act to dis-
courage severe polyfurcation of complex tort cases until the separate 
and distinct nature of complex elements can truly be determined. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Rule 42(b)'s application in the toxic tort context is particularly 
harmful to injured parties. There are three mechanisms that serve to 
deny plaintiffs a fair jury trial in severed cases. First, case-by-case 
application of an ill-defined common law standard combined with lim-
ited appellate review provides judges little guidance for severing 
issues. With increased docket pressure and a legal system encourag-
ing judicial case management, toxic tort cases will continue to be tried 
in pieces, solely because of their complexity. Second, creating many 
trials within one cause of action triggers the exclusions in the Rules 
of Evidence more often than a unified trial would. Because causation 
is so difficult to prove for plaintiffs in toxic tort cases, this creates an 
unfair impact on injured parties and violates their right to place 
before the jury all the probative evidence of their case and contro-
versy. Lastly, bifurcation restricts the ability of the jury to infuse the 
law with community values necessary for the proper development of 
the law. 
304 Interview with Jan Schlictmann, Plaintiffs' Attorney in the Woburn Case (Mar. 1997). 
300 See HARR, supra note 1, at 287, 392, 448 (negative responses from jury as to Beatrice). 
306 See Kennedy, supra note 21. 
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The Woburn trial highlights the problems inherent in Rule 42(b) 
application. Until the substantive impacts of Rule 42(b) application 
are fully recognized by the law, splitting of toxic tort cases should be 
more closely scrutinized by appellate courts, academics, and practitio-
ners. 
